Homeowner's Association/Security Service Not Liable For Injuries Suffered From Drunk Driving Accident On Property

Recently, California courts reviewed the issue of whether a security company and common interest development had any liability for injuries sustained as a result of a fatal traffic accident within the development. The key issue was whether the security company and the Association owed a duty to the injured to protect him from the accident. The good news for associations and security companies is that both the trial court and appellate court rejected the notion that either entity owed a duty to warn or protect the injured, absent the establishment of a "special relationship."

In general, defendants may not be held liable for the failure to control the conduct of third parties without the existence of a "special relationship" that would create such a duty to control a third party's actions. The main focus of this article will be to discuss such liability as it concerns the duty of homeowner's associations and private security companies to regulate private communities. Many people would assume that simply entering a private community controlled by a "for-hire" security company would create a duty for the security company to protect against, and subsequently be liable for, any breaches of safety that may occur while on the private property. Many people would also assume that the general duty owed to them and their safety would be equivalent to the duty given to them by their local police/sheriff's department. But, without the existence of a "special relationship," as determined by the courts, no real duty exists (beyond any particular duty spelled out in a contract between the community and security company) for the security company/ community association to prevent or be liable for third-party actions. This issue was discussed and examined most recently in a California Court of Appeal, Fourth District decision in the consolidated cases of Titus v. Canyon Lake Property Owners Association, and Titus v. Barton Protective Services (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4th, 906.

By way of background of both cases, James Hauser and Jack Incorvia (victims) were residents in Canyon Lake, a private community controlled by the Canyon Lake Property Owners Association (CLPOA) and governed by their CC&Rs. James Hauser was killed when he was a passenger in Jack Incorvia's car. Incorvia, while intoxicated, lost control and drove the car off the road into a tree within the community. Jaylee Titus, Hauser's daughter, sued both CLPOA and Barton Protective Services (Barton), a security company hired by CLPOA to enforce its governing documents. The Plaintiff (Titus) contended that CLPOA and Barton had a duty to "affirmatively act to protect Hauser from the risks created by allowing Incorvia to drive within the Community." Titus v. CLPOA, (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4th 906, 911. Titus conceded the fact that, in general, the defendants would not be held liable for the failure to control a third party's action resulting in injury. However, Titus argued that Barton had a "special relationship" with Incorvia and the other residents of the community that gave rise to a duty of care. Therefore, based on this alleged duty of care, Titus sought to impose liability upon Barton and CLPOA for not properly regulating the community and for not preventing Incorvia from driving drunk throughout the property.

In order to determine whether a "special relationship" existed, giving rise to a duty to protect (and warn), the California Court of Appeal analyzed the same factors used to determine whether a general duty of care arises. The court cited the following factors to be weighed, as determined from Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113:

1. Foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. Here, the court held that Incorvia's conduct in the past did not present the prerequisite "high degree of foreseeability," as to the accident that occurred.
2. Degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury.
3. Closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered. The court concluded that there was no allegation that CLPOA or Barton encouraged or had some involvement in Incorvia's intoxication.
4. The moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct. Here, the court required a higher standard of culpability than mere negligence. They required that the defendant:
   1. Intended or planned the harmful result;
   2. Had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior;
   3. Acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct; or
   4. Engaged in inherently harmful acts.
5. The policy of preventing future harm. The court held that ejecting Incorvia from the premises would not have prevented him from causing harm elsewhere (outside the community) and would not have protected his passenger (i.e. Hauser) from injury.
6. The extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community for imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.
7. The availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

One important thing to note from this decision is that these Rowland factors are not exhaustive and the court is permitted to analyze factors beyond those listed that tend to show a relationship between the parties and the accident-causing event. Titus, 118 Cal.App. 4th, 906, 912. Also, while the Plaintiff argued that the CC&Rs created an affirmative obligation for security within the community boundaries, the court specifically held that such obligations "do not, without more, create a 'special relationship' requiring defendants to affirmatively act to protect Community residents form Incorvia." Id.

If, after balancing all the relevant factors, the court held that there existed a 'special relationship' between the injured party and CLPOA and/or Barton, a duty to protect Hauser would have been present. Upon review of the factors in this case, the court concluded that the connection between the defendants and the individuals involved in the accident was remote. Therefore, a special relationship did not exist between the two parties so as to create liability for either CLPOA or Barton Security.

The court cited facts in support of its position such as there was no contract between CLPOA and the victims, CLPOA did not make any promises on which the victims relied and the defendants did not create the situation which led to the accident, nor magnify damage caused by the accident. Thus, without a duty of care established, the court held that the Plaintiff's 'second amended complaint failed to allege facts creating a duty on the part of either CLPOA or Barton to act to prevent Incorvia from driving intoxicated within the Community.' Id. at 916.

The importance of this particular case is that most homeowner associations providing security services do not have a "special relationship" with residents of the community giving rise to a duty to protect them. Associations providing security services want to pay special attention to the seven factors that are weighed by a court in determining whether a "special relationship" exists. To the extent that these factors balance in favor of an association (lack of connection to injury causing event, low level of foreseeability of injury, minimal connection between association and the injured, etc.), the less likely that a court will impose a duty on an association to prevent an injury.

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